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THE PITFALLS OF DIVERSION -
CRITICISM OF A MODERN
DEVELOPMENT IN AN ERA OF
PENAL REFORM
By DARRYL T. DAvIES*
At the present time, there is a general trend in criminological thinking
toward less formalistic and non-adversarial procedures for handling persons
who have violated the criminal law.' The rationale behind this thinking has
been largely three-fold. First, there has been a recognition that over-reliance
on the criminal courts when dealing with offenders has also meant an over-
reliance on imprisonment in responding to them. Secondly, the prison popula-
tion has increased dramatically and, as a result, there are serious difficulties
in controlling and managing the large numbers of people in overcrowded
institutions.2 Finally, the reconviction rates of offenders have unequivocally
demonstrated that imprisonment is not reducing recidivism, and may even be
contributing to it. The rash of prison disturbances, hunger strikes, hostage-
taking incidents, sit-ins, suicides, and physical violence within the peniten-
tiaries in recent years, has illustrated that imprisonment is an ineffective and
anachronistic method of coping with offenders and preventing crime in society.3
Whether this movement in developing new remedial methods is due to
the pressures of institutional expediency, or whether it reflects a profound
philosophical shift in coping with criminal behaviour is difficult to ascertain.
In any event, new programmes are advocated and large-scale reforms are cata-
logued under the broad label of diversion.4 Diversionary programmes are
implemented in a number of provinces and indications are that others will be
© Copyright, 1976, Darryl T. Davies.
* Darryl T. Davies is a Research Consultant to the Law Reform Commission of
Saskatchewan in the Provincial Offences Project. The views expressed herein represent
those of the author in his personal capacity.
I See, Raymond T. Nimmer, "Diversion: The Search for Alternative Forms of
Prosecution" (1974), Chicago, Illinois: American Bar Foundation 43. See, also, Dennis
Briggs, In Place of Prison (Temple Smith, New Society, 1975). This point is also made
in The Principles of Sentencing and Dispositions, Working Paper No. 3 of the Law Re-
form Commission of Canada (Ottawa: Information Canada, 1975) at 7-14.
2 Nimmer, supra, note 1 at 43-45.
3 See, Vorenberg and Vorenberg, "Early Diversion from the Criminal Justice Sys-
tem: Practice in Search of a Theory", in Lloyd E. Ohlin, ed., Prisoners in America
(Englewood Cliffs, NJ.: Prentice-Hall, 1973) at 154. For further discussion on this
subject, consult Imprisonment and Release, Working Paper No. 11 of the Law Reform
Commission of Canada (Ottawa: Information Canada, 1975); K. Hawkins, "Alternatives
to Imprisonment", at 67-71 in Sean McConville's (ed.) The Use of Imprisonment: Essays
in the Changing State of English Penal Policy (Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1975).
4 See, Diversion, Working Paper No. 7 of the Law Reform Commission of Canada,
(Ottawa: Information Canada, 1975).
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following their example.5 The general disagreement over what diversion is
and what it is not has resulted in considerable confusion. The Oxford English
Dictionary defines diversion as follows: "(1) the turning aside (of anything)
from its due or ordinary course or direction; a turning aside of one's course;
deviation, deflection. (2) the turning aside (of any person or thing) from a
settled or particular course of action, an object, or the like." As a result of
the varying definitions that have been proposed, the concept of diversion is
held by some to encompass a wide range of alternatives, and yet is narrowly
confined to specific decision-making areas within the criminal justice system
by others.0
The difficulties that have been encountered in defining diversion have
made a consensus on its objectives extremely problematic. We do not know
which offenders will be affected by diversion (i.e., first offenders, recidivists),
who will be responsible for the administration of diversionary programmes,
or whether it will occur at a pre-trial level or at the post-adjudication level.
It is difficult to ascertain which aims of the penal system are addressed by
diversion and what societal concerns have been excluded in its formulation.
Furthermore, the advocates of diversion programmes do not state whether
such programmes serve a rehabilitative or retributive function, or both.
For the purposes of discussion in this paper, diversion is defined as any
non-judicial procedure that aims at reducing the role of the criminal court
by diverting cases away from its purview, and that places emphasis on resti-
tution to the victim and the use of more informal and non-adversarial methods
of handling criminal offenders. A move toward less adversarial procedures
in dealing with offenders is not devoid of difficulties; this paper outlines the
pitfalls and weaknesses of diversionary programmes as they pertain to the
accused, the victim, and society.
A. LIMITING PROCEDURAL LAW
In advocating diversion, proponents' thinking has been influenced in part
by an optimistic belief that a less encumbered and non-adjudicative method
of handling offenders may prove to be more successful than criminal court
sanctions have been in the past.
It should be noted, however, that as we move toward a system of
justice that places less and less reliance on procedural law, we may be ulti-
mately creating a system that is even less equitable and imposes even greater
5 The Province of British Columbia is using community service orders and is work-
ing toward developing alternative programmes in the treatment of offenders. The Province
of Saskatchewan is operating a fine options programme while Alberta has set up a pro-
gramme of restitution for the victim in the City of Calgary. Other provinces are operating
with a similar objective.
0 Nimmer, supra, note 1, at 4: ... when such diversion is possible under the label,
the label is useless. To assert that diversion is successful (or unsuccessful) is meaningless
when one speaks of such diverse practices; there must be more precise specification of
the activity. The ambiguity results from a failure to specify from what and to what the
defendant is diverted." A similar criticism is voiced by Nora Klapmuts, "Diversion from
the Justice System" in Crime and Delinquency Literature, March, 1974 at 109.
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hardship on the accused than might be imposed had his case been subject
to the procedural and evidentiary requirements inherent in a judicial hearing.
First, we will be supplanting the present judicial structure, and its rigid evi-
dentiary rules and requirements, with a new system that has not experienced
the unique tradition and evolutionary development of its predecessor, the
criminal court. Secondly, the modem invention of diversion is being called
upon to perform a task that the judicial system has been able to accomplish
only through historical experience and legal precedent. Diversionary altema-
tives are in an experimental phase, and it is unwise to jettison present-day
court procedures for a system that may prove to be even more costly and less
effective. Finally, the social and economic costs avoided by a non-adversarial
proceeding may be incurred by the more extensive surveillance of offenders
that will be required in the community by the criminal justice system. The
procedural protections afforded persons under the due process of law will be
usurped by unfettered administrative discretion, stripping the offender of the
only real protection he would have against official abuse of authority. The
rehabilitative ideal is still an ideal, and, as Francis A. Allen has indicated,
such a social welfare approach in the criminal law may not be fair and in
the best interests of the person to whom it is ultimately applied.
7
B. VENGEANCE
Vengeance is deeply entrenched in the public's conception of the ad-
ministration of the criminal law. It follows that any attempt to utilize com-
munity-based dispositions, or diversionary practices that largely exclude the
revenge aspect of the criminal law, may not be accepted by society as the most
effective route for dealing with offenders. It has been recognized that punish-
ment plays both a retaliatory and denunciatory function in the administration
of the criminal law: reassuring society that no person who breaks the law will
ultimately escape punishment for such acts, and showing society's disapproval
of the crime."
However, a more important question must be addressed. To what extent
does a punishment-oriented model of criminal justice create a situation where
attempts at reconciliation and resolution of the problem will be subordinated
to obtaining vengeance and judicial retribution? As the objectives of the
criminal law are predicated in part on judicial vengeance, it is conceivable
that the general public will regard vengeance as an appropriate and legitimate
method of protecting its interests. For example, a demand for vengeance
7 Francis A. Allen, The Borderland of Criminal Justice: Essays in Law and Crimi-
nology (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1964) particularly at 16-24 and 25-
28. For a more elaborate analysis of the treatment ideology, see, Johannes Andenaes,
Criminology General Prevention Revisited: Research and Policy Implications (1975), 66
The Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology, especially at 339. Norval Morris makes
this point as well in The Future of Imprisonment, (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1974) at 18.
8 See, Nigel Walker, Sentencing in a Rational Society (London: Penguin Books
Ltd., 1972) at 36. This point is also made in Imprisonment and Release, Working Paper
No. 11 of the Law Reform Commission of Canada (Ottawa: Information Canada, 1975)
at 19-23.
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becomes apparent when we deal with the subject of accountability within the
criminal justice system. A person victimized by official abuse, or a person
subjected to harassment by a particular agency within the criminal justice
system (i.e., the police, prison guards) will more often believe that redress
can only be achieved when vengeance is achieved. This means that attempts
at an informal resolution of the conflict, as in a mediatory proceeding, may
not be regarded as the most viable and effective method of dealing with an
offender if society perceives it to be a non-punitive response.
When the criminal justice system emphasizes the denunciatory nature
we can also assume that the public accepts vengeance as a legitimate and
acceptable option to be followed whenever victimized. Therefore, informal
resolutions would seldom be regarded with the same degree of satisfaction as
the outcome of a case where the plaintiff successfully gains "his pound of
flesh" from the defendant. A judicial system operating with the philosophy of
not only penalizing the accused, but also promoting retaliation in the courts
against him, could inculcate such a philosophy in the minds of the public, thus
diminishing the prospects of attempting to reach an informal settlement through
non-adversarial procedures.
C. FAILURE OF THE COURTS
Proponents of diversion have, to a large extent, erroneously attributed
defects in the administration of criminal justice to the criminal courts. The
function of the court is to render a verdict based on law and probative evi-
dence. There is an erroneous belief that the courts are responsible both for
the high recidivism rates and the failure of penal sanctions to deter criminal
offenders. If alternatives to imprisonment are lacking, the fault lies not with
the judiciary, but with the legislature.
If available sanctions are either too severe or inadequate, it makes more
sense to provide the courts with legislatively-created alternatives in order to
improve the flexibility of the sentencing process. An increase in criminality
cannot be attributed solely to the judiciary. The criminal court is no more
responsible for unofficial retaliation by prison staff against the offender, by
reason of having convicted him of a criminal offence, than the apathetic public
is for not reporting crime, or the inadequately trained police are in not
detecting it. To suggest that by attaching the umbilical cord of diversion to the
criminal justice system, we will prevent crime and control criminal respon-
sibility more effectively than the legal system, is purely speculative and
without empirical justification.
D. THE BARTHOLOMEW EFFECT OF REFORM
Diversion is part of what I call the "Bartholomew Effect in Penology";
that is, in our eagerness to devise alternatives to imprisonment, we may
merely replace one method with another; creating more problems in the
process. Throughout the evolution of the penal system, there has been a
tendency to move precipitously in attempts to find cheap and effective solu-
tions to the crime problem, rather than to exercise caution in considering the
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potential abuses that might accompany those 'solutions'. As Laud Humphreys
wrote, after reading David Rothman's The Discovery of the Asylum:
The social planner should study this book as penance, realizing the evil he can do
by applying social theory to solving human problems. That goes for social scien-
tists, legislators, journalists, and all sorts of moral entrepreneurs. Those in the legal
profession should read it because when not numbered among the reformers, they
may provide our only protection against those who strive to rehabilitate us 9
Before venturing into the untrammeled area of diversion, would-be re-
formers of the criminal justice system should consider the costs that might be
incurred in the process. Failure to do so may create, in turn, an unforeseen
menace that may be as equally disastrous as the one created years ago with
the invention of the penitentiary. The historical roots of American penology
vividly illustrate the traces of benevolence and philanthropy that led to the
development of the penitentiary. 10 The concomitant tremors of that 'archi-
tectural fault' continue to rumble up to the present day, and some modem
penologists predict that the 'earthquake' in the penitentiary system is not far off.
The progeny of that unusual wedlock in penology, between rehabilitation of
the offender and incarceration in the penitentiary, has undoubtedly proven
to be our central nemesis in the administration of the criminal justice system.
E. DIVERSION - A MEANS OF DISPUTE-RESOLUTION
Certain after-care agencies, such as the John Howard Society of Sas-
katchewan, have argued that diversion should focus on a mediation procedure
aimed at resolving conflict between the offender and the victim." Under such
a programme, the John Howard Society would act as mediator in specific
cases referred by the police, the prosecutor, and in some instances, the courts.
There is a belief that resolving disputes in this manner will prove to be
more effective than the present system, because it will place responsibility
for the crime on the offender and force the offender to confront the victim.
The consent of both the victim and the accused is required for mediation. The
programme of mediation is flawed by serious shortcomings, such as the absence
of the right to counsel, the right to a public hearing where guilt is judicially
determined according to the rules of evidence and of law, the right to cross-
examine witnesses, and the right of appeal. Furthermore, the proceedings of
pre-trial diversion, such as those in a mediationary programme, are not bound
by explicit written rules. This lack of standardization may result in inequities,
since proceedings will neither be governed by judicial precedent, nor subject
to public scrutiny. The low visibility of administrative decision-making may
result in administrative disparities in the handling of offenders. Under this
system, there is a strong possibility of discrimination against the poor. Not
unlike the problems experienced when imposing fines, a mediation programme
9 David J. Rothman, Discovery of the Asylum (Boston: Little Brown and Company,
1971). Also consult Richard V. Ericson, Penal Psychiatry in Canada: The Method of Our
Madness (1976), 26 U. of T. LJ. 17.
-1 Id. at 84-85.
" John Howard Society of Saskatchewan, Paper on Diversion (Regina: June, 1975)
especially at 10.
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will enable middle-class offenders to purchase their freedom in an area of low
visibility by merely making restitution to the victim.
12
F. DIVERSION - PRESUMPTION OF GUILT
There is no guarantee that an accused who consents to diversion wil be
fully cognizant of his loss of rights. In such proceedings, the principle of our
system of justice that guilt ought to be established in a court of law, is vital.
An admission of responsibility does not, by itself, constitute a finding of guilt
in a court of law. There is a strong possibility that a person, ignorant of his
rights at law, may participate in a mediation proceeding and make restitution,
when he would have been acquitted of the charge in a criminal court.
Our system of law is based on the philosophy that a person is presumed
innocent until proven guilty; but under a system of diversion there is no
comparable safeguard. The responsibility for determining guilt is a judicial
function and not a policy or prosecutorial decision to be decided arbitrarily
outside the court room. To allow such unstructured discretionary power to
prevail is to seriously prejudice a criminal case; it excludes the significant role
played by the defence lawyer and thereby permits the scales of justice to be
heavily weighted against the accused. Since the proposed intermediary would
have no legal training, the abrogation of basic legal rights in a diversion
programme is a serious possibility.
G. VICTIM v. THE OFFENDER
Dispute-resolution programmes are often perceived to be effective be-
cause they bring the offender and victim together in a situation designed to
reduce conflict between them. Unfortunately, there is no evidence at present
to suggest that such a meeting will be in the best interests of either party.
The accused may deceptively comply with the proceedings in order to avoid
what he thinks will be a harsher disposition by the courts. There is little
evidence to suggest that such a proceeding will serve the value of educating
the offender and forcing him to accept responsibility for his act. A meeting
could merely exacerbate the situation, inconvenience the victim, and possibly
result in confrontation between the victim and the offender. Fear of retaliation
might be perceived by the victim as an even greater threat in this type of non-
adversarial proceeding than in a court of law. The victim may be reluctant to
meet with the offender in what may prove to be a very intimidating and
embarrassing experience. It is conceivable that persons may refrain from
reporting crimes to the police if they know they may have to deal personally
with the offender in order to gain redress.
H. DOUBLE JEOPARDY
The John Howard Society of Saskatchewan suggests that a diversionary
scheme, such as mediation, will complement the present court structure. How-
2 This point is made in Fines, Working Paper No. 6 of the Law Reform Commis-
sion of Canada (Ottawa: Information Canada, 1974) at 32.
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ever, if the offender or the victim elects to pursue the matter legally, rather
than in a pre-trial diversion programme, or, if he has done so, and then defaults
on the diversion order, there is a very strong likelihood that the judge will
impose a harsher punishment on the offender.
13
I. EFFECTS ON DETERRENCE
There is a possibility that the deterrent of a criminal court sanction might
be substantially reduced in a diversion programme. 14 For example, the adverse
consequences of participating in a pre-trial mediation proceeding would not
be as great as those where the stigma of a criminal record accompanied the
conviction of the offender in a court of law. In this regard, diversionary
programmes ignore the vital fact that one of the few deterrents to control
middle-class persons from breaking the law is the public exposure to which
they are subjected in the court room. The deterrent effect of the 'denunciatory
ritual' in the court does have a significant impact on the middle and upper
classes, and diversion would minimize, to a certain extent, and perhaps obviate
its effect. The important deterrent effect of what Harold Garfinkel has called
"status degradation" will be lost in the process.' 5
I. DIVERSE AIMS OF THE PENAL SYSTEM
The agencies within the criminal justice system have different objectives;
the use of an all-encompassing definition of diversion, such as that proposed
by the Canada Law Reform Commission,16 will require much greater co-
ordination than presently exists within our justice system if it is to be effective.
The likelihood of achieving uniformity in handling criminal offenders among
the diverse agencies in our criminal justice system is doubtful. For example,
the police do not view their function as being synonymous with that of a social
worker. Law enforcement agencies are very reluctant to participate in pro-
grammes which they perceive to be too lenient, and policemen are particularly
skeptical of after-care agencies, such as the John Howard Society, which
advocate remedial programmes.
A danger also exists that the police will use their discretion of referral
selectively and capriciously, and, consequently, decide that two offenders who
have committed similar offences, who are of the same age, and who have
similar backgrounds ought to be subject to different treatment. Police referrals
to a diversion programme may be largely persons from the middle and upper
classes, where there will be a greater likelihood of a lenient disposition.
17
Is This point is taken into consideration by the Law Reform Commission of Canada
in its Working Paper, Diversion (Ottawa: Information Canada, 1975) at 19-20.
14 Hawkins, supra, note 3 at 79.
15 Harold Garfinkel, Conditions of Successful Degradation Ceremonies, (1956) 61
American Journal of Sociology at 421-22.
16 Note the definition of "diversion" by the Law Reform Commission of Canada in
its Seventh Working Paper, Diversion (Ottawa: Information Canada, 1975).
17 Police officers may feel a harsher disposition is warranted for the lower-class
section of the population. A policeman's discretion in this regard will be unstructured and
arbitrary, and the possibilities for abuse will be substantial.
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Police offenders might believe that intractable and lower class persons will be
dealt with more effectively by the courts, where the severity of a criminal
sanction will be adequate to punish and deter them, than by a diversion
programme.
K. EXPANDING THE NET OF SOCIAL CONTROL
Another criticism of diversion is the fact that some of its programmes
(i.e., dispute-resolution programmes) may apply to persons who would nor-
mally have been dealt with outside the adversarial process.18 By referring
persons to a diversionary programme, we could be extending the net of social
control by exposing more persons, rather than fewer, to the criminal justice
system. There is a possibility that a person who commits an offence, who
would otherwise be warned by the police, might end up being referred to a
specific non-adversarial agency for adjudication. If such a person breaches or
defaults on a diversion order, it is possible that he may be diverted eventually
into the criminal justice system, rather than away from it.
L. DIVERTING THE RECIDIVIST
Diversion programmes do not give an indication of how they will handle
recidivists. A person who agrees to a resolution of a situation outside of the
court may in fact persist in his criminal behaviour. As a result, the offender
could be making restitution to one victim, while committing a crime against
another. It is illogical to expect that once detected he should voluntarily meet
with all his victims, and then make restitution on a level that could be well
beyond his financial means.
Proponents of diversion do not define what constitutes a first offender
in their programme. The standard practice of taking offences into considera-
tion has been condoned by the courts and often regarded as a mitigating
factor when sentencing the offender. Under a diversionary scheme which
emphasized mediation, it is unlikely that an offender will be prepared to admit
to the frequency of his previous criminal activity, especially if he knows he
may be required to confront and make restitution to more than one victim.
M. SUMMARY
In light of the previous discussion, it is apparent that diversionary pro-
grammes present major problems that must be solved before we can consider
them to be viable and pragmatic alternatives to the existing criminal justice
system. When we seek non-adversarial alternatives, we should consider the
fact that we still have not adequately assessed the effectiveness of present
measures, such as fines, probation, and discharges.19 There is no empirical
18 Diversion, Working Paper No. 7 of the Law Reform Commission of Canada
(Ottawa: Information Canada, 1975) at 15.
19 Although empirical research has been carried out, there is still considerable un-
certainty about the efficiency of using specific types of penal measures for offenders. See
R. good and R. Sparks, Key Issues in Criminology (New York: McGraw Hill, 1970).
Although the fine options programme is being used in Saskatchewan, it is still too
premature to draw conclusions about the effectiveness of the programme.
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evidence available to indicate that diversion will be more effective in reducing
the prison population, lowering recidivism rates, deterring offenders, and pro-
tecting society more effectively. As a result, it is premature to advocate a move-
ment away from the present court structure and sanctions system.
Before we adopt unorthodox measures on an extensive basis, we should
try diversionary programmes on a piecemeal basis until such time as they
prove to be more effective than present criminal sanctions in dealing with
offenders. Diversionary programmes would have to be subject to continuous
experimentation and evaluation; initially they should apply only to those
criminal cases where a judicial determination of guilt has already been made
and the likelihood of a short-term prison sentence for the offender appears
inevitable.
The creation of a diversion bureaucracy outside the court room is un-
necessary if we can incorporate diversionary alternatives into the sentencing
process. If present criminal sanctions are too rigid, it makes more sense to
strengthen and expand non-custodial methods within the confines of the legal
system, where they can be administered by the courts. Legislation at the
provincial or federal level to enact a Diversion Act would be extremely useful,
and ought to be a sine qua non before any form of diversionary programme is
implemented. Under a federal or provincial statute, specific rules and proce-
dures would then govern the disposition of cases according to the law. The
decision to refer a person to a diversionary programme would be governed
by the courts, thus giving the judiciary greater latitude in using non-custodial
methods when sentencing criminal offenders.
Before moving too rapidly in adopting new techniques, we ought to
consider the social and economic costs to the offender, the victim, and society.
Deterrence has proven to be effective only where the negative consequence of
detection are familiar to the offender.20 The risk we run by generating a pro-
liferation of new methods for handling offenders is the concomitant widespread
confusion which might result for both potential criminal offenders who weigh
the costs involved in committing a crime, and the courts which must select
the appropriate sanction for a particular offender.21 Increasing the use of
non-custodial methods and the injection of new diversionary alternatives into
the sentencing stage will require an expansion of present court facilities and
personnel if they are to be properly administered.
If our objective is to improve our system of dispensing justice, then we
can operate safely within the present system by reforming our laws and
amending the Criminal Code to ensure the law is in tune with present societal
values. To move too quickly in one direction or the other is dangerous; we
may unknowingly sacrifice extremely important legal values and procedural
protections in our eagerness to reform the criminal justice system.
20 E. A. Fattah, "Deterrence: A Review of the Literature", in Fear of Punishment:
Deterrence, the Law Reform Commission of Canada (Ottawa: Minister of Supplies and
Services, 1976) particularly at 27-29.
21 Supra, note 3 at 78.
1976]

